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ABSTRACT
Prevailing views suggest the Industrial Revolution began in Europe because markets had gradually
become more efficient and by the 18th century the scope of economic activity was far larger than in
other parts of the world. This paper compares the actual performance of markets in Europe and
China, two regions of the world that were relatively advanced in the pre-industrial period, but would
start to industrialize about 150 years apart. The analysis covers economies that account for about
two-fifths of the world's population in the mid-18th century, and it considers some three centuries
of data. Our findings suggest that relative levels of market function in China and Europe were similar
prior to the Industrial Revolution. Higher efficiency in Europe is seen only in the nineteenth century
when industrialization was already underway. Moreover, these improvements occurred in a dramatic
and sudden fashion, further casting doubt on an evolutionary view of market development. Rather
than being a key condition for subsequent growth, gains in efficiency appeared simultaneously with
the turning point of modern growth. We discuss the implications of these findings for a number of















Recent interpretations of the Industrial Revolution suggest that it started around 1770 in 
Britain and spread to United States and Western Europe by the mid-19
th century.
1  The turning 
point of modern economic growth was a remarkable event because it was the first time in human 
history that per capita growth rates much above zero became sustainable over the long-run.  How 
did a world of static expansion make its way to one of sustained increase in GDP per capita, and 
why did the Industrial Revolution start its spread from Europe and not elsewhere?   
Prevailing views place a great deal of emphasis on how efficient markets and good 
institutions are necessary for modern growth.  According to North and others, by 1700 Britain 
and the Netherlands had developed a set of institutions—common law, property rights, and non-
distortionary pricing systems—that would lead to more efficient resource use and provide far 
greater incentives to make investments that would raise income per capita (North and Weingast 
1989, North 1981, North and Thomas 1973).
2  The Industrial Revolution is thus seen as the 
outcome of the evolution of European institutional forms, which has successfully taken root in 
other countries as well in the last two centuries.  The historical record of Europe attests to an 
expansion of influence through trade and migration over long-distances (Chaswick and Hatton 
2003, O’Rourke and Williamson 1999).  European settlers, by bringing with them their heritage 
of good institutions, in some cases created the basis of long-run growth in these countries 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).
3     
Empirical studies focusing on the importance of market-supporting institutions on 
                                                 
1 The year 1770 is often chosen as the starting date of the Industrial Revolution because a number of key 
innovations, including the spinning jenny (1764), the water frame (1769), the steam engine (1774), and other 
inventions in the cotton industry as well as ironmaking were introduced around this time.  See Crafts (1985) and 
Crafts and Harley (1992) for estimates on productivity growth rates between 1770 and 1861 in Britain. See 
Maddison (1989) on international income comparisons in the last three centuries. 
2 See North and Thomas (1973). 
3 Banerjee and Iyer (2002) show how different colonial policies have led to cross-regional income variation in India.   2
economic incentives include Frankel and Romer (1999), who provide contemporary cross-
country evidence in support of a positive correlation between trade and growth, as well as the 
influential work of Hall and Jones (1999), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002).  In the 
framework of Hall and Jones, countries that were more strongly influenced by Europeans in past 
centuries have social infrastructures more conducive to high levels of output per worker today.  
In addition to these studies, microeconomic studies that focus on private sector investment and 
the return to investment projects have generally found a positive association between 
government policies that protect property rights and returns (Isham and Kaufmann 1999, 
McMillan 2002).   
This paper contributes to the literature on institutions and long-run growth by analyzing 
the relative efficiency of European markets over three centuries.  Certainly, a more efficient 
economic system should be more productive.  It is also very likely that large increases in 
incentives to invest occurred only after the onset of the Industrial Revolution, when the returns 
were much higher.  The possible endogeneity of efficient markets and growth makes it difficult 
to ascertain causal direction.  However, if better market-supporting institutions were a pre-
condition for European growth, and European institutions were in some way exceptional, we 
would expect to find that European markets were more efficient compared to markets in non-
European economies well before Europe started to industrialize. 
To see whether markets were very different in the pre-industrial world, this paper 
compares the actual efficiency of markets using data on the spatial dispersion of grain prices 
from the 17
th to the 19
th century.  We focus on China and Europe, two regions of the world that 
were relatively advanced as of the mid-18
th century, and yet would start industrializing about 150 
years apart.  The aim is to see whether European markets were already outperforming markets in   3
China before the period of its industrialization, or whether large efficiency differences in 
commodity markets are a relatively recent phenomenon.   
The analysis in this paper uses a number of empirical methodologies to assess different 
aspects of market efficiency.  Overall, the methods give results that are consistent with each 
other.  The main results of the paper suggest that as late as 1780, markets in China were as 
efficient as those in Europe.  The efficiency of English markets at this time, however, was 
greater than that found in the most advanced parts of Continental Europe as well as China.  
Furthermore, market efficiency in Europe improved between 1780 and 1830, and the 
improvement occurred dramatically and suddenly in comparison to what came before.   
This paper relates to many contributions on the Industrial Revolution and cross-country 
comparisons, some of which are discussed further in section II.  It is the first study, as far as we 
know, to provide a quantitative comparison of markets across Europe and most of China in the 
pre-industrial era.  In addition, our starting point is somewhat different from the convention that 
assumes good institutions => market efficiency => growth.  We do not assume that efficiency 
Europe was higher because it was the first to industrialize.  In addition, efficiency may be a 
function of many factors, and these remain to be untangled.  Thus, in our view: {good 
institutions, geography, factor endowments, incentive to innovate, and other factors} => market 
efficiency => growth.  In addition to North’s incentive arguments mentioned above, other writers 
have suggested numerous potential explanations for the Industrial Revolution, including 
geography (Diamond 1997, Sachs 2003), technological diffusion (Mokyr 1990), human capital 
accumulation (Inkster 1991, Mitch 1999), household labor organization (de Vries 1994), ecology 
(Wrigley 1988), religion and Protestant ethics (Weber 1903), and the discovery of new frontiers 
(Webb 1952).  Institutional outcomes might have also arisen from interactions with these   4
explanations (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2002, Sokoloff and Engerman 2000).  Sokoloff and 
Engerman (2000), for example, focus on how local factor endowments exert an influence over 
institutional outcomes.  A better understanding of changing patterns in market efficiency should 
provide a more complete picture of industrialization on many fronts as there are few explanations 
of growth that do not depend on the existence of, or have implications for, efficient markets.  
Our analysis also sheds new light on a number of specific questions surrounding the 
industrial revolution.  One is whether the Industrial Revolution was a uniquely British 
phenomenon, or whether the more advanced countries of Europe, such as France, China and 
other non-Western areas of the world were equally plausible contenders (Crafts 1995, Pomeranz 
2000, Goldstone 2002).  Overall comparisons of relative living standards remain elusive, in part 
because cross-country income differences in the 18
th century were relatively small, but there is 
general agreement that within China, the Yangzi Delta was one of the most developed.
4  In a 
prominent recent study, Pomeranz maintains that whatever advantages England had over the 
Yangzi Delta, it was not in its markets, and that more generally, “China comes closer the 
neoclassical ideal of a market economy than Europe.”
5  This paper distinguishes England from 
the rest of Europe, and compares both to markets in the Yangzi Delta and in China overall. 
Another issue on which we can bring new evidence to bear is whether the sources of 
growth in Europe might have originated from a long process of development stretching back for 
many centuries (perhaps as far back as the year 1000), or emerged rather recently in the last 
couple of centuries.
6  Because we follow the same economies over several centuries, this reduces 
many important identification problems because persistent factors unique to Europe—such as 
                                                 
4 For living standard comparisons, see for instance Allen (2002, 2001) and Bairoch (1975, 3-17).  
5 Pomeranz (2000, 17).  See Huang (2002) on the “involution” thesis. 
6 There appears to be no evidence of there being any dramatic shifts in economic growth until at least the 19
th 
century. See Crafts (1994, 45).   5
geography, customs, intellectual and ethical tradition, or language are held constant.   
A comparison of the scope of incentives should have more general implications for 
existing theories on long-run economic growth to the extent that these theories depend on 
efficiency considerations.  More generally, the question of market functioning is also important 
in furthering understanding of the origins of modern growth, how it can be sustained, and how it 
may be spread across economies today.   
 
2.1 Market efficiency and prices across locations: a simple framework 
We compare the efficiency of markets in China and Europe using prices in different 
locations.  The failure of prices of identical goods to equalize between sites—the failure of the 
law of one price to hold—is indicative of limited trade possibilities.  There are several notions of 
market efficiency in the literature, each of which focuses on different aspects as well as different 
underlying causes.  To guide our discussion below, we introduce a simple general framework. 
  Consider an economy with many locations, n = 1,…, N, where consumers in all locations 
have the same preferences.  In each location there are many producers with the same technology 
for producing a grain crop, which cannot be stored to the next period.  Output is a function of the 
local harvest (Hnt), which is affected by random shocks due to weather (climate, rainfall, etc).  
All else equal, we expect that the local price in location n at time t can be written as 
(1) ) ( nt nt H f P = , with  . 0 (.) ' < f  
With random weather shocks, local prices will vary randomly as well, unless trade between 
locations is feasible.  In the extreme, if grain is perfectly tradable—there are no trade barriers—
its price in period t will be equalized across locations:  t n P P t nt , ,∀ = , or, the law of one price 
holds.  This is a standard interpretation of market efficiency.   6
  One reason why prices might not equalize is that the markets are geographically 
separated.  Recent work in international trade suggests that some of its major features can be 
explained by geographic considerations (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1998).  Take the 
widely-used case of iceberg transport costs, for example: exporters in location n have to send z > 
1 units for every one unit of the good that arrives in the destination market j (a fraction  z / 1 1−  
melts in transit).  With iceberg transport costs, the price of location n relative to the price in 








which corresponds to Heckscher’s (1916) commodity points of trade.  According to equation (2), 
the full equalization of prices cannot be achieved: the presence of transport costs means that 
prices in locations n and j are in equilibrium whenever they are in the range (1/z, z).  As long as 
the pre-trade prices are such that 
(2’)  1 − < − z P P jt nt ,  
there will be no trade between locations n and j in period t. 
Moreover, trade is more likely to occur within neighboring locations because 
transportation costs are relatively low.  Let  nj d  be the distance between locations n and j; we 
expect that z is a function of distance,  ) ( nj d z , with  () 0 . > z .  This will mean that the equilibrium 
range of no trade is larger the larger is the distance between markets: 




nj jt nt d z P P .   
A natural measure of market efficiency in this context is the degree to which prices in 
locations n and j differ from each other for a given bilateral distance nj d , because this can be   7
viewed as an estimate of the transport cost function: the larger are the differences between  nt P  
and  jt P  for a given distance, the lower is the efficiency of the market.  Below, we present 
evidence on the width of the equilibrium price band for a given distance to compare market 
efficiency in China and Europe. 
  In addition to geography there are other factors that impact on the degree to which 
arbitrage will equalize prices between markets.
7  The presence of national borders, for example, 
may be one important factor (Engel and Rogers 1996, Shiue 2004a).  Governments often collect 
tariff revenues or impose other trade costs at national borders.  These measures may be viewed 
as man-made transportation costs, and these can be easily accommodated in this framework.  In 
addition, there may be other costs associated with trading across national borders, for instance, 
translation costs if different languages are spoken in the two locations n and j.  Let  nj z ˆ  denote the 
trade costs between markets n and j conditional on distance.  This suggests that ( ) nj nj nj b z z , ˆ ˆ τ = , 
with partial derivatives  0 ˆ > τ z , 0 ˆ > b z , where  nj τ  are trade policy barriers between markets n and 
j, and  nj b  captures other national border-related trade costs. 
  Trade costs may incorporate other transactions costs.  First, arbitrariness and the absence 
of the rule-of-law tend to raise transactions costs.  If there is a positive probability of 
expropriation by the government, this will act as a tax on trade, just as the risk that a merchant 
might be robbed en-route to his destination will reduce trade.  Both raise the expected costs of 
trade, and in our framework lead to a wider band of ‘no trade’.  Similarly, if property rights are 
not well-established or not well-enforced, this will reduce the efficiency of markets.  For 
instance, if a buyer (from location i) lacks the means to ensure that a seller in location j will not 
                                                 
7 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) survey several of the trade costs we discuss in the following.   8
cheat once the former has made his payment, this will reduce the buyer’s incentive to engage in 
the transaction—and this makes the band of no trade wider.  
  Another set of issues that might affect the efficiency of markets is the monopoly power of 
local incumbents.  Local producers have an incentive to prevent the import of lower-cost goods, 
and may try to influence local officials to impose additional costs on suppliers from the outside.
8  
Powerful vested interests may lead to restricted market access, so that the equilibrium price band 
becomes wider and market efficiency declines.  Summarizing, if we let  nj z ~  denote the trade costs 
between markets n and j conditional on distance, the previous considerations suggests that in 
equilibrium, prices in n and j can lie anywhere in the range of  nj jt nt nj z P P z ~ / ~ 1 ≤ ≤
− , and there will 
be no trade if and only if the pre-trade prices satisfy 
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nj nj nj nj nj nj v r a b z z
) ( ) (
,
) ( ) ( ) (
, , , ~ ~ τ . 
In equation (4), anj stands for risks associated with bandits, or more generally, anarchy, rnj 
denotes strong property rights, and vnj captures the strength of vested interests (e.g., guilds), with 
the expected partial effects given below each variable. 
Our comparison of market efficiency captures the joint effect of many of the key 
arguments of why the Industrial Revolution first took root in Europe, and not in China, even 
though it does not distinguish between them.  First, Smithian arguments of the size of the market 
are captured directly by the degree of price dispersion conditional on distance.  Differences in 
market size may in turn be determined by the existing quality and costs of transportation 
technology in Europe, versus China.  A number of recent growth theories suggest that the rate of 
                                                 
8 In the case of grain, local officials tried to keep markets open for imports, at least in times of bad harvests, because 
they feared food riots and a general loss of legitimacy. During normal times foreign suppliers often faced special 
permits and other regulation that were only suspended in times of crisis (Seiffert 1893), consistent with the influence 
of vested local interests.   9
innovation is a function of market size because the return to innovation increases with market 
size.
9  Second, the trade policy influence on the costs of arbitrage in equation (4) captures the 
degree to which European national versus Chinese provincial governments imposed trade 
restrictions that distorted or prevented trade.  
Third, the border variable captures a host of different influences, which seem on the 
whole to favor China, since it was a unified empire at the time.
10  The fourth influence, anarchy, 
is often associated with the extent of rule of law, government expropriation, general security, and 
the absence of war.  The fifth variable, property rights, discussed earlier, has been emphasized by 
North and Thomas (1973), in their argument that weak property rights restrict the effective size 
of the market, and thereby limit the scope of specialization and the division of labor.  And sixth, 
it has been frequently noted that vested interests, for instance guilds, might have been a major 
force of retardation in some economies.
11 
 
2.2 Measuring market efficiency 
A number of different methods are used to assess market efficiency.  First, we study the 
variability of grain prices in a given location one at a time.  Segmented markets tend to show 
relatively high price variability compared to integrated markets because the local price is 
determined by random shocks to the local harvest (see equation 1).  This single-market measure 
has the advantage of capturing the influence of other markets without imposing a particular trade 
structure.  
Our second method is to examine the relationship between pairs of markets.  Specifically, 
                                                 
9 See Aghion and Howitt (1998) for an overview, and Jones (1995) for a critique. 
10 Note, however, that different spoken dialects are used in China. 
11 Olson (1965), Landes (1969); the latter for instance argues that it required the guilds to move aside for 
competition to become self-enforcing in Europe; page 19.   10
the strength of bilateral price correlation conditional on distance is used to study the width of the 
no trade band (see equation 4).
12  If there were differences between Europe and China in terms of 
the leading suspected causes for the Industrial Revolution, our discussion above indicates that 
their combined effect can be gauged from a comparison of market efficiency (measured byz ~ ). 
Third, we employ cointegration techniques to look for evidence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between two price series as an additional way of comparing market efficiency in the 
two continents.  If there is a long-run equilibrium relationship—i.e., there is a tendency to move 
to the band of no trade in equation (4)—this provides evidence on the strength of the forces of 
market arbitrage.  A specific version of this cointegration approach allows also for formal testing 
of the (absolute) law of one price (this corresponds to z ~ = 1) and the estimation of the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.  These three methods produce largely the same basic 
result, and we believe that other standard methods would yield similar conclusions as those 
found in this paper.
13   
The focus is on the grain market not only because it is of major importance in pre-
industrial economies, but also because it remains an important market once the process of 
industrialization has begun.  While cotton textiles, the energy generating industry (steam engine), 
and the iron and steel industry dominated the growth of manufactured output, there is ample 
evidence suggesting that productivity growth occurred in the agricultural sector as well, albeit in 
                                                 
12 One reason for studying price correlations instead of absolute price gaps lies in the multitude of currencies in 18
th 
century Europe, together with imperfect data on exchange rates. One can show that for a given distance, a smaller 
(larger) range in terms of absolute prices implies a higher (lower) correlation of prices. For an analysis of absolute 
price gaps for a more limited set of markets in 19
th century Europe, see Shiue (2004a). 
13 Each of the three methods—although rarely all three—has been widely used in historical or contemporaneous 
studies of market integration, of the law of one price, as well as of purchasing power parity (e.g. O’Rourke and 
Williamson 2004, Persson 1999). Other approaches to estimating market efficiency include threshold autoregression 
models (Taylor 2001) and spatial regression models (Keller and Shiue 2003); we think that these as well as other 
methods would yield the same qualitative conclusions as this study.   11
a more broadly diffused manner.
14  One might ask whether the efficiency of grain markets has 
implications for the efficiency of markets in these economies overall.  In general, although the 
Industrial Revolution is commonly linked to manufacturing industries, as long as the source of 
change was economy-wide in nature, its benefits should accrue to commodity trade in all 
products.  This would be especially true if the basis of Britain’s efficiency were in economy-
wide institutions, advanced transport and communication, and other shared technologies.  
Moreover, linkages between the primary and secondary sectors, as well as general equilibrium 
effects more generally (specifically, between goods and factor markets) also suggest that 
processes affecting incentives will not be bottled up in a single market.
15  Thus, a comprehensive 
comparison of grain markets will shed light on economy-wide levels of market efficiency. 
Before presenting the empirical results, we give some background on China and Europe 
in the 18
th century, and discuss the major characteristics of the data. 
 
3. Background on the economies: China and Europe  
The land area under analysis is roughly evenly divided between Chinese provinces and 
European nation-states.  In terms of population, available estimates indicate that the population 
in the 10 Chinese provinces in our sample in the late 18
th century was about 120 million.  The 
population of Europe at this time might have been 120 to 150 million (Durand 1960, McEvedy 
and Jones 1978).  
Although foreign trade in the 18
th century was not significant, China’s expansive empire 
meant that even domestic trade involved distances large enough to be equivalent to international 
                                                 
14 Harley (1999) attributes more than one-third of all productivity growth in the British Industrial Revolution to 
agriculture.  
15 One reason, for example, why capital markets are important is that they allow more efficient trade in 
commodities, permitting to import goods at some time while exporting at another.   12
trade in Europe.  Trade between the fertile agricultural areas in the upper reaches of the Yangzi 
River and the urban regions of Shanghai at the Yangzi Delta involved covering distances of at 
least 1,200 kilometers, approximately the distance of the trade route between Antwerp and 
Vienna. The maximum distance between markets in our sample for Europe is about 1,400 and 
for China about 1,850 kilometers. 
Grain was the most important commodity produced and traded in the pre-industrial 
world.  In China in the 18
th century, as in Europe, the labor force was predominately engaged in 
agriculture. The majority of the population was engaged in small-scale, producer-cum-consumer 
farming, and available estimates suggest that agricultural output made up at least 60 % of GNP 
in pre-industrial economies.
16  Grain was an important commodity not only in overall output but 
in consumption as well.  The share of cereals in the diet of urban dwelling northern Europeans, 
who it is said ate more meat and fish than their southern neighbors, was still nearly 60%, a figure 
also likely to be significantly lower than for the average farmer.
17 
There is ample evidence that the Chinese state as well as individual European 
governments tried to regulate grain supplies.  China had state-run granaries for the purpose of 
price stabilization, although the maintenance of these granaries was in serious decline by the late 
18
th century.
18  In Europe, policies were used to help stabilize bread prices, and the presence of 
many political borders likely made it easier in Europe, than in China, to regulate commodity 
traffic.  In both regions, it was the case that the fixing of grain prices by decree was seldom 
carried out.  Overall, it is unclear which economy had more regulations, or was more successful 
                                                 
16 See Chang (1962, 291-325) for his estimate on the share of agriculture in China in the 18
th century. Li, B. (1998) 
cites Qing observers who put the percent of the population engaged in agriculture in the Yangzi Delta at 50% during 
the late 17
th century.  In Britain in 1700, approximately 61.2% of male labor was employed in agriculture and 65% 
of total income (from industry and agriculture) was in agriculture; see Table 3.1 in Crafts (1994).  
17 Spooner (1961).  
18 See Will and Wong (1991), Shiue (2004b and 2004c).    13
in carrying out stated objectives. 
Our analysis focuses on grain prices as opposed to the volume of grain traded for two 
reasons.  First, trade volume statistics are very spotty, and the resulting evidence would be weak 
at best.
19  Second, even if we had good data, there need not be a relationship between trade 
volumes and market efficiency.  In terms of the framework of section 2, the volume of grain that 
needs to be traded between markets n and j in order to reach the band of no trade (e.g., equation 
2) may be large or small, but either is associated with the same market efficiency (the width of 
the band). 
We now turn to a discussion of the data set. 
 
4. Prices in China and Europe 
This paper employs data on market prices in a large set of locations throughout Europe 
and China.
20  Figure 1 gives a graphical summary of the years of data available for each series; 
the range is from the 15
th to the 20
th century, although we limit the empirical analysis to the 17
th 
to 19
th century.  The prices for the European markets are for wheat, the dominant grain in most 
regions.  The closest homogenous good that matches this characteristic in China is rice, and for 
this reason we select the ten main rice producing provinces of China.
21   
The Chinese series consists of 121 locations; at 54 years of data, it is relatively short 
compared to the time series availability of some European markets.  However, the geographical 
                                                 
19 In Europe, rough calculations suggest that 1 % of total consumption of the Mediterranean area was traded in the 
16
th century, and the situation may have remained much the same in the 17
th century (Braudel 1992, 127). In China, 
the Yangzi Delta alone—with an area of 43,000 square kilometers and an estimated population in the range of 20-36 
million inhabitants in the 18
th century—may have imported as much as one-quarter of its total grain consumption 
(population estimates for this period are imprecise; these are reported in Li, B. 1998, 19). 
20 With the exception of a portion of the London series, the European sources employed in this paper are all official 
records of transactions at markets with many buyers and sellers (so-called mercuriales price series). Also the prices 
for China are market prices; see, e.g., Wilkinson (1969). 
21 For the Chinese province of Hunan, we have information on both wheat and rice prices; a comparison of these 
data suggests that grain type, wheat in Europe and rice in China, does not have a major influence on our results.   14
coverage of the Chinese price reports is much broader than it was in the European sample.  The 
Chinese data captures 121 contiguous markets, a region comprising about 60 % of the empire 
and including the most commercialized areas as well as relatively remote regions.  The combined 
geographical scope of the European markets is narrower.  Another difference is that nearly all the 
European price data up to the 18
th century are from regions that were fairly important markets.  
Only in the 19
th century does more contiguous data become available, which, as in the case for 
France, begins to include records from small markets as well.  Some of the smaller cities in the 
Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg (located to the east of Hamburg), for which we have price records, 
were not particularly central points of commerce either. 
 Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the price series.  The sources for each 
series give quite detailed information on the method of collection of each series and the units of 
account.  Due to changes in units of account, all prices have been converted to common units of 
currency per volume (or weight) within a series.  We have not tried to account for changes in the 
value of the currencies over time.  Missing information on the (typically) silver content of the 
coins would necessarily lead to low-quality estimates.  However, while our overall sample 
stretches over three centuries, the window of time for which we compare market efficiency are 
typically only 25 years long.  For this and a number of other reasons, we do not think that 
inflation has a major impact on our findings.
22 
The most important differences among the various price series have to do with the 
method of collection and the degree of aggregation in the price information.  What allows us to 
measure the impact of differences in these respects is the fact that there are only a small number 
                                                 
22 For instance, this analysis avoids times of high and volatile rates of inflation, such as the Napoleonic Wars. In 
addition, prices were broadly trending upwards over time in both Europe and China, and it is not clear for which 
markets inflation was higher (if any). On inflation in China, see Wang (1992). We have also investigated the 
importance of inflation for our results by allowing for a trend in the deterministic component of the cointegration 
relationship (equation 7 below); formal tests generally reject that hypothesis.   15
of different ways to collect market prices, and that there is enough data such that we can always 
find several markets sharing commonalities in their method of recording prices.  The key 
differences are given in Table 1.  Columns I through III give information on the location of the 
market in today’s country, the name of the location in historic times, and the source of the data.  
Columns IV through IX provide summaries of the differences among each series, which include 
the frequency of observation (IV), the years available (V), the method of collection (VI), whether 
minimum and maximum prices are recorded (VII), whether there is spatial aggregation in the 
method of collection (VIII), and whether quantity data has been used to compute price averages 
(IX).  Additional details about these differences and references to units of each series used in this 
paper can be found in the Data Appendix. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Single-market price volatility 
Many previous studies have used the volatility of the price in a given market as an 
indication of how segmented one market is from other markets, on the rationale that volatility 
should decline as markets become more connected to other markets through trade (e.g., 
McCloskey and Nash 1984).  During the period 1742 to 1785, the average coefficient of 
variation for 15 European markets for which there is data is equal to 0.188, with a standard 
deviation of 0.051.  For the 121 markets in Chinese prefectures during the same period, the 
average coefficient of variation is equal to 0.131 (standard deviation of 0.029). 
Instead of price levels, another widely used measure is the volatility of period-to-period 
price changes (e.g., Engle and Granger 1991).  Let pt denote the log of the price in period t.  
Under the assumption that markets are efficient, prices fully reflect all known information, and   16
the best forecast of the price next period is the price in the current period. This forecast will be 
correct up to a random shock (εt), which is white noise.  This random walk model is thus given 
by  
(5)   t t t p p ε = − +1        for t = 1, … T-1;             
where εt is independent and identically distributed with zero mean and variance 
2
ε σ .  The 
conditional mean is  
(6)   [] t t t p I p E = + | 1 ,    
with It being the information set at time t.  Allowing for seasonal effects extends equation (5) to  
(5’)   t t t t S p p ε ϕ + = − + ' 1 , 
where S is a (1 x 2) vector of indicator variables.   
After estimating the parameters ϕ by ordinary least squares, we compute the standard 
deviation of the estimated residual  t ε ˆ  as our measure of volatility.  On average, this volatility in 
the 15 European markets is 0.127, with a standard deviation of 0.025.  For the 121 Chinese 
markets, the volatility is on average 0.092, with a standard deviation of 0.020.  Both the 
comparison of the price levels as well as of first differences suggests that the price volatility for 
Chinese markets is comparable to or lower than price volatility among European markets.  From 
these results, it appears that the degree of market efficiency in Europe, as captured by these 
volatility measures, was not exceptionally greater in comparison to that in China.  
 
5.2 The correlation of prices across market pairs 
 The price correlation between two markets gives another measure of market efficiency.   17
Higher correlation suggests more trade links, all else equal.  Generally, price correlations 
between markets decline as distance increases, because the costs of transport rise with distance. 
In comparing efficiency across market pairs, it is useful to condition on transport costs and thus 
hold distance constant.
23  The average bilateral correlations are listed in Table 2a for the years 
1742-95.  We have formed a number of samples with markets selected for comparability and 
commonality of period.  For instance, the table gives the correlations for the provincial capital 
prefectures of China.  These places were important from a political point of view, but were not 
necessarily well-linked by trade routes.  For comparison, the table also tabulates correlations for 
the Yangzi Delta region and among the Yangzi River prefectures.   
For Europe, the table includes results for 15 markets in today’s Germany, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg, Germany, and France (Table 2a, bottom).  The 
choice of locations is to some extent determined by the availability of data.  For example, the 
years over the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are for the most part avoided.  The sample 
was selected, however, to include the most advanced regions of Europe, or the early industrial 
nations.  As the first country to industrialize, England is a particularly interesting case, and is 
presented separately from the results for Western Europe as a whole, along with France, 
generally considered the most advanced on the Continent (Table 2a, lower part). 
  The results of Table 2a confirm that, as expected, price correlations decline with distance.  
There is also heterogeneity in market efficiency conditional on distance, both in China as well as 
in Europe.  For instance, in China the range of average correlations for distances between 150 
and 300 kilometers is from 0.81 to 0.58, while in Europe the average correlations for distances 
between 450 and 600 kilometers vary from 0.71 to 0.53.  The following Table 2b shows results 
                                                 
23 Distance might be correlated with some factors determining z ~  in equation (4) as well. If so, by conditioning on 
distance we hold constant more than transport costs. This effect, however, should be of second order.    18
for price correlations in Europe starting in the 17
th and 19
th century, which are results that pre- 
and post-date, respectively, those of Table 2a.  These two tables contains too many figures to 
fruitfully discuss all possible comparisons that might be of interest, and below we will highlight 
a number of them using graphs.  In addition to average price correlations for a given distance, we 
have also analyzed computed the gradient of price correlation with distance using OLS 
regressions.  These results complement our analysis and are presented in Table 3. 
 
Turning to Figure 2, this shows the scatterplot of price correlation and distance for 15 
European cities in the period 1770-1794.  It also shows the price-distance relationship for two 
samples of Chinese markets: those located on or near the Yangzi River, and the provincial capital 
markets.
24  If the results for the two Chinese samples are indicative of the range of efficiency in 
China’s markets, it would seem that market efficiency in Western Europe was roughly 
comparable to the efficiency of Chinese markets.  This is suggested by Figure 2, since as the 
figure shows, it is possible to identify markets in China where the price-distance relationship lies 
above and where it lies below that for the European markets.  
Moreover, it appears that the degree of market efficiency attained in Europe as of the late 
18
th century had been roughly at that stage for some time.  Figure 3 compared the estimate 
between the late 17
th century (1692-1716) and the late 18
th century (1770-1794).  The markets 
underlying the sample for the two periods are not identical due to data availability, and there are 
fewer series in the earlier sample, but there does not seem to be marked improvements in market 
efficiency over this period.   In particular, the estimated level and slope of the relationship 
between correlation and distance for the later period lies fully within the confidence bands of the 
                                                 
24 The maximum distance of coverage for the European markets is about 1000 kilometers. Given that the Chinese 
sample includes markets with distances up to about 1,850 kilometers, it is possible to choose many different market 
group configurations for the Chinese sample.   19
earlier period.  It appears that levels market efficiency can remain in relative stasis for extended 
periods of time.  
The lack of any dramatic shifts in market performance in Europe over the 80 years before 
1770 is in contrast to the changes that would be seen in the 50 years after 1770.  Figure 4 shows 
the price correlation estimates for 15 cities across Western Europe between the years 1825 to 
1849.  The regression line and confidence band are above all other market groups (including 
those for China).  This figure also suggests that changes to the level of market efficiency can 
make dramatic improvements over a relatively short period of time.
25 
As noted above, the availability of data in Western Europe tends to be limited to the more 
important urban centers of Europe.  The data for China is different because it is fairly 
comprehensive, and includes not just important marketing centers, but also relatively remote 
places where one would not expect much trade.  Figure 5 and Figure 6 show bilateral 
correlations for all 121 markets in China, given by the 7260 circles in the plots.  The 15 
European markets are shown by the 105 squares, and they lie within the Chinese markets in 
Figure 5.  Figure 6 provides a striking contrast to Figure 5—it is clear that Europe has moved 
ahead.  While we do not have reliable data for China in the later period, we expect that there was 
no equal advancement in market efficiency over these 45 years in China.  
Figure 7 compares the bilateral price correlation among the markets of the extended 
Yangzi Delta with England.  The maximum distance for the two samples is about 600 
kilometers.  The regression line for the English sample is located above the estimate for the 
Yangzi Delta sample at virtually all distances.  For distances up to 400 kilometers, the 
                                                 
25 This improvement may be related to the reduction of trade barriers, of which the German Zollverein was the 
major example. At the same time, the Zollverein liberalizations did not start until 1834, they came in many rounds 
throughout the 19
th century, and did not affect all of our European markets (see Shiue 2004a); which means that its 
effect on our findings may have been limited.   20
confidence band of the extended Yangzi Delta crosses the English sample, indicating that the 
two samples are not distinguishable for greater distances.  
The same statement could not be made for similar distances within nations of Continental 
Europe.  Figure 8 plots the price correlation and distance diagram for 10 cities in central France, 
for an area considered to be a fairly well-integrated region within France.  The plot, which also 
gives the confidence bands for the French sample, together with the Yangzi Delta sample, 
suggests that the two samples are indistinguishable at all distances.   
Markets in England as of 1770 thus appear to have had an advantage in market 
efficiency, and were not only more integrated than in the most developed regions of China, but 
also compared to regions in Western Europe as a whole.  By the early 19
th century, markets 
across Europe improved to an extent that it looked similar to England.   
 
5.3 Cointegration among markets 
This section compares market efficiency in China and Europe by employing time series 
techniques.  The concept of cointegration was introduced by Granger (1981), Engle and Granger 
(1987) as a way of characterizing the long-run relationship among a set of variables.  Formally, 
cointegration refers to a situation in which a set of variables yn, n = 1,2,…,N, is each integrated 
of order d > 0 (or, I(d)), while a linear combination of the yn variables is integrated of order (d – 
b), (I(d-b)), with b > 0.  Of particular interest is the case where d = 1 and b = 1, that is, where 
each variable by itself is non-stationary (it has a unit root), while a linear combination of the 
variables is stationary; this case is denoted as CI(1,1).    
In our context, a linear combination of grain prices that is stationary when each 
individual price is not would support the idea that the grain prices evolve in a long-run   21
relationship in which arbitrage (that is, trade) prevents the prices to drift arbitrarily far apart.  In 
terms of the above framework, cointegration among two series means that there exists an 
attractor—a line, or, due to transportation costs, risks, and other factors, a band; see equation 
(2)—towards which the prices tend to attract over time.  In this sense, testing for cointegration 
provides evidence on market efficiency. 
We have used two different methods to study cointegration across the markets of our 
sample.  Primarily, we rely on the methodology proposed by Engle and Granger (1987).  This 
approach is quite robust and requires relatively few distributional assumptions.  We have also 
employed Johansen’s (1988) maximum likelihood method, which can give additional insights, 
although at the cost of being more restrictive.
26  Both of the methods lead to the same qualitative 
findings, and in the following we focus on Engle and Granger’s (1987) technique.  Appendix A 
discusses results using Johansen’s techniques. 
Engle and Granger’s (1987) method may be described as follows.  Consider the price 
series in location 1 and in location 2, p1t and p2t, where for any location n,  nt nt P p ln = , and 
t=1,…,T.  The question is whether or not a long-run (cointegrating) relationship exists between 
p1t and p2t.  First, assume that both p1t and p2t are known to be I(1).
27  Then, we estimate the 
following OLS regression: 
(7)   t t t e p p + + = 2 1 0 1 β β . 
If p1t and p2t are cointegrated, there will be some β1 and β0 such that  0 2 1 0 1 = − − t t p p β β  is 
                                                 
26 Johansen’s method allows estimating both the cointegrating rank and the model parameters simultaneously using 
an efficient one-step procedure, whereas Engle-Granger’s two-step procedure can entail a loss of efficiency. Another 
advantage of Johansen’s method is that it allows for testing restrictions on the long-run relationship and for 
estimating the speed of adjustment in a maximum likelihood framework. At the same time, Johansen’s method 
requires errors to be normal, which is not necessary in the Engle and Granger approach; see, for example, Maddala 
and Kim (1998) for more discussion. 
27 We have tested for that. Typically the null hypothesis of I(1) cannot be rejected using standard unit root tests.   22
satisfied.  Here, et is the equilibrium error, and the vector β,  [ ]' 1 0 β β β =  is the cointegrating 
vector.  The constant  0 β  captures long-run differences in the price levels.
28  The slope 
coefficient  1 β  is an estimate of the degree to which prices in the two markets are moving 
together ( 0 0 = β  and  1 1 = β  means the absolute law of one price holds, while  0 0 ≠ β  and  0 1 > β  
means the relative law of one price holds).  Engle and Granger’s approach to testing for 
cointegration between p1t and p2t is to test whether et is stationary: the stationarity of et implies 
that the linear combination of prices p1t and p2t is stationary, or, (p1t, p2t) are cointegrated. 
Our test of whether the estimated residual  t e ˆ  of equation (7) is stationary is based on the 
unit root test proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979):  
(8)   . ˆ ˆ 1 1 t t t e e ε δ + = ∆ −  
Under the null hypothesis that  t e ˆ  is I(1), the parameter δ1 is equal to zero; failing to reject that 
0 1 = δ  provides evidence that  t e ˆ  is I(1) and p1t and p2t are not cointegrated.  More generally, the 
stronger is the evidence that δ1 is below zero—i.e., the lower is the t-statistic of  1 ˆ δ —the stronger 
is the evidence that p1t and p2t are cointegrated.  We compare the efficiency of markets in China 
and Europe by comparing the evidence for cointegration in terms of this t-statistic for a number 
of different samples. 
This method is implemented with a number of modifications.  First, the dependent 
variable lagged once is added as a regressor in (8) to reduce problems due to serial correlation 
(turning this into an Augmented Dickey Fuller [ADF] test):
29 
                                                 
28 One reason why we need a constant is that some of the prices are quoted in different currencies and quantity units; 
as noted above, we do not have reliable exchange rates for all times and currencies in Europe. 
29 Information criteria that trade off the increase in fit with the reduction in degrees of freedom are generally 
recommended for choosing the number of lags to be included (Engle and Yoo 1987).  We have used Schwarz Bayes   23
(8’)   t t t t e e e ε η δ + ∆ + = ∆ − − 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ . 
Second, we include seasonal effects in the cointegrating relationship, equation (7), as 
they are important for agricultural goods.  Third, we reduce the effect from outliers in (7) by 
adding indicator variables to the deterministic component for periods with exceptionally strong 
price changes.
30  Because these modifications affect the distribution of the critical values of 
hypothesis tests based on the t-statistic of  1 ˆ δ , the available t-statistics do not apply anymore.  For 




Turning to the results, in Figure 9 the average ADF t-statistic is shown by distance class 
for European markets during the years 1742 to 1795.  Seven non-overlapping distance classes are 
used, and with 15 markets, there are a total of 210 bilateral relations.
32  We find the lowest ADF 
t-statistics for the smallest distances—less than 150 kilometers—which is what one would 
expect: the evidence in support of cointegration is strongest among relatively near markets.  As 
bilateral distance increases, the evidence for the existence of long-run relationships among 
markets generally falls (higher values for the t-statistic of 1 ˆ δ ).  This is illustrated by the 
logarithmic trend line for the European sample, also shown in Figure 9.
33 
                                                                                                                                                             
Information Criterion (SIC; see, e.g., Maddala and Kim 1998, 77).  For these data, the SIC generally suggests one or 
zero lags of  t e ˆ  should be included. 
30 We treat a price change that is larger than one standard deviation as an outlier; some experimentation with other 
definitions indicates that the main results are not sensitive to this choice. 
31 MacKinnon (1991) allows computing approximate small-sample critical values, which we report below. 
Asymptotic critical values are tabulated in Engle and Yoo (1987). Note that the standard ADF critical values do not 
apply because  t e ˆ  is estimated.  
32 We do not restrict the estimate of the cointegrating vector (if one obtains  1 ˆ β  in one direction, one expects 
1
1 ˆ − β  in 
the other); in our case, not imposing this restriction plays no major role for the conclusions. 
33 While the average ADF t-statistic appears to be a good measure of the evidence for cointegration among different 
markets, we have also computed other statistics, such as the median. Table 4 presents both for comparison,   24
The lower line in Figure 9 summarizes the evidence on cointegration for the English 
markets (40 counties, plus London) in our data set.  Clearly, for a given distance, the average 
ADF t-statistic is considerably below that for the European sample, or, the evidence for 
cointegration among the English markets is higher than for the European sample as a whole.
34  
This difference may in part be due to the fact that the comparison is between markets in different 
countries versus markets in one country (England), and, that border effects are important.  
However, we have seen above that the English markets are relatively efficient even if compared 
with other within-country samples, such as France.  The relatively strong evidence for 
cointegration for England is highly consistent with the results from bilateral price correlations.  
More generally, these results highlight that there was a substantial amount of heterogeneity in 
efficiency within Western European markets in the second half of the 18
th century. 
How does the evidence on cointegration in Europe compare with that for China during 
this period?  Figure 10 shows how the ADF t-statistic varies with distance for the same sets of 
Chinese prefectures, as in section 5.2 above; the values for the European 15 markets (from 
Figure 9) are plotted again for comparison.  For distances less than 150 kilometers, the evidence 
for cointegration is stronger in Europe than in China, while for distances of 300-900 kilometers, 
market efficiency in China appears to be ahead of Europe (on average).  This is true of the China 
River sample as well as the expanded Yangzi Delta markets (note that there are no markets in 
this group greater than 750 kilometers in bilateral distance). 
                                                                                                                                                             
indicating that average and median are similar in this case. This table also reports the standard error of the average 
ADF t-statistic. Analogous tables accompanying Figures 10-12 are not included for space reasons, but are available 
upon request. Formal cointegration tests are not reported because—as noted above—there are no exact critical 
values. However, as a point of reference, based on MacKinnon’s (1991) analysis, we compute approximate critical 
values of -3.95 (-3.40) at the 1% (5%) significance level. 
34 We have adjusted the t-statistics for the English sample for comparability with the European sample based on 
MacKinnon (1991). He shows that critical values for these cointegration tests are a function of T, the time series 
length (on average, T=50 for the English and T=80 for the European market pairs; there are two monthly 
observations per year). In essence, it becomes easier to find evidence in favor of cointegration the larger is T, so the 
critical values need to be adjusted to hold the significance level constant.   25
The group of Chinese provincial capital markets gives regional diversity.  The ADF t-
statistic for this group lies always below that of the average European city (see Figure 10).  This 
is interesting because even though this sample represents the major city in each province, the 
sample covers areas in China that, at that time, are clearly not among China’s most advanced 
regions.  The Chinese provincial capitals are also far apart, so it does not encompass distances of 
less than 150 kilometers, where market efficiency in Europe appears to be relatively high.  
Finally, Figure 10 includes the average ADF t-statistic for the sample of all 121 Chinese 
markets.  The key results are best gleaned from the trend lines provided in Figure 11.  The 
evidence on cointegration from all 121 Chinese prefectures is weaker than in Europe for 
distances up to about 400 km, and stronger than in Europe above that threshold.  Figure 11 also 
shows the trendline for the Yangzi Delta prefectures.  There, the evidence for cointegration is 
stronger than for Europe for all distances except those less than 150 kilometers. 
 
Overall, the evidence for cointegration is consistent with the analysis above in sections 
5.1 and 5.2: there does not appear to be a large difference in terms of market efficiency between 
China and Western Europe.  But what about Britain?  Figure 12 suggests that markets within 
Britain were different from the average European markets.  In addition, Figure 12 shows the 
average cointegration statistics for the English markets, compared to the Yangzi Delta 
prefectures.  The evidence for cointegration among English markets is stronger than among 
Yangzi Delta markets at all distances (up to 600 kilometers, the maximum distance between 
markets in England).  This supports the hypothesis that English markets were more efficient than 
those in the most advanced part of China at this time. 
Thus, these results suggest that while the Yangzi Delta had similarly efficient, or possibly   26
more efficient markets compared to Western Europe as a whole in the later 18
th century, 
Britain’s markets in the last three decades of the 18
th century were more efficient still.
35   The 
gap between Britain and Western Europe was not large in the sense that the continent attained 
the level of integration that Britain had at the end of the 18
th century within the next several 
decades.   Figure 12 shows the cointegration statistics for European markets for the years 1825-
49, after the dust following the Napoleonic Wars had settled.  Market efficiency was 
substantially higher in Europe in the first half of the 19
th century than in the late 18
th century, but 
this improvement led to a level of market efficiency that was not so different from Britain during 
the years 1770 to 1794. 
 
Before we summarize and evaluate the results, we turn to a possible objection of our 
analysis.  The issue is whether our results may be driven by different weather patterns in Europe 
and China.  With agricultural products such as wheat and rice, weather will typically have a 
major influence on the local price (equation 1).  If weather would change quite differently across 
geographic space in China than in Europe, this could lead to substantial differences in spatial 
price correlations without any implications for trade and market efficiency.  For this reason, we 
have compared historical weather data for China and Europe to see whether the spatial weather 
patterns could bias our comparison of market efficiency.  Our analysis suggests that spatial 
weather patterns have not been very different in the two continents, and specifically, it is 
unlikely that the influence of weather has favored China over Europe in our comparison; see 
Appendix B. 
 
                                                 
35 The period for which we have English prices is slightly later than the Chinese sample (the samples are centered 
around the year 1782, versus 1769, respectively), but ten to fifteen years per se does not make a big difference, as 
we have confirmed by restricting the analysis for China to 1770-94.   27
 
Summary and discussion 
The above sections have used measures that exploit variations in cross-sectional price as 
well as those that consider variations over time to measure the degree to which markets are 
connected.  The results are robust to several different well-known methods that assess market 
efficiency.   
First, we find comparable degrees of market efficiency in China and Europe in the late 
18
th century.  For short distances, Europe appears to have been slightly ahead of China—these 
may correspond to distances within countries.  Over longer distances, however, China was 
ahead.  We do not find evidence to support the idea that Europe (in a sample that includes 
locations in the Netherlands, Britain, and Belgium, for example), had exceptionally efficient 
markets by 1700.  We do not see exceptional efficiency in European markets even at the end of 
the 18
th century, when Europe was on the verge of an industrial revolution.   This contradicts 
historical analyses that suggest good institutions created exceptionally efficient markets in 
Europe early on.  
Second, we find that market efficiency in Britain stands out among Western European 
countries in the late 18
th century, and it is also higher than in China’s Yangzi Delta.  That Britain 
was ahead of Western Europe as a whole at this late date is an important result.  In particular, the 
lateness of the improvements in efficiency contradicts interpretations that place much emphasis 
on the early, gradual, and definite institutional advantages that Europe had on this front.  It also 
shifts the focus away from the importance of slow-moving institutional improvements that were   28
accumulated bit by bit since medieval times.
36  Even assuming that Britain and the Netherlands 
were both pre-industrial and on par as of 1700, as has been claimed by North and others, the 
brevity of time during which the paths of Britain and other Western European countries then 
diverged may be taken as further evidence against theories that rely on highly persistent factors 
that change only very gradually (e.g., morals, religion).
37  Generally, the large difference 
between Britain and Continental Europe suggests that in so far as the origins of the Industrial 
Revolution are concerned, we need to look for differences between the two regions.  The 
differences may help to provide a theory in which over a relatively short period of time (1700-
1770) conditions emerge such that Britain industrializes while Western Europe as a whole does 
not. 
Third, Continental Europe did develop more efficient markets compared to China, but it 
acquired them swiftly and relatively late, in the 19
th century.  Sudden change in markets might 
come about if the sudden change in Western European markets may be linked to a driving force 
that can generate very rapid changes.  It may be that an important difference between the 
institutions of China and Europe was that in addition to offering equal incentives to efficiently 
trade, European institutions also allowed flexibility and rapid changes to be made to existing 
institutions.  In addition, there may also be yet another non-institutional factor more directly 
responsible for the sudden changes that we observe.  Technological innovations, for instance, 
could lead to sharp discontinuities in efficiency.
38  
                                                 
36 In a statement that seems to echo North’s thesis, E. Jones maintains, “Political insecurity and institutional rigidity 
in feudal and medieval times so obviously held back productive investment that the course of their reduction is 
virtually a history of development.” Jones (2003, 93). 
37 Certainly, complex systems can generate vastly different dynamics due to only a small change in very short time 
(bifurcations). At the same time, we are not aware of evidence on such highly non-linear effects in this context. 
Most of the empirical literature uses linear (not non-linear) regressions (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2001). 
38 Mokyr (1999), for instance, cites the sharp upward jump in patent statistics in Britain in the late 1750s, but argues 
that the role that patent laws and institutions had in raising the return to innovation is overrated (pp. 42-43)   29
Although 1770 is the date often associated with the onset of the Industrial Revolution, it 
has been difficult to define the economic significance of what was going on in Britain.
39  Europe 
between the late 18
th and the early 19
th century provides a useful point of comparison because 
there, we have documented changes that suggest a clear turning point.
40  The fact that the degree 
of efficiency seen in Europe by the mid-19
th century are similar to Britain in the late 18
th century 
suggests that important economy-wide changes had indeed occurred in Britain by around 1770.     
In Continental Europe, higher efficiency precedes the more definite (and dramatic) 
increases in economy-wide productivity that would appear later in the late 19
th and early 20
th 
century.  Can efficient markets, then, be taken as a causal explanation of why the industrial 
revolution took place in Europe?  While it’s tempting to answer in the affirmative, we do not 
think that we can be sure about it.  The fact that the large differences in efficiency emerge fairly 
late might suggest the causality between efficiency and growth is bi-directional.  The main issue 
is that we can no longer place 1825-1849 as being strictly before the onset of industrialization for 
Continental Europe because certain factors that were overtly important to European 
industrialization had diffused to the continent over the 18
th century.  Already in the 18
th century, 
for instance, many of the early and key innovations of the British Industrial Revolution had 
found its way to France, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, and Sweden.
41  In addition, British skills 
flowed to the continental in the form of human capital, and possibly other important sources of 
growth were spread to there as well.  The transportation revolution and intensive railway 
construction is one example of a late 19
th century development that increased measured market 
                                                 
39 The fact that we find evidence of a British lead in 1770-1794 is notable in light of recent evidence from Crafts and 
Harley (1992) suggesting growth rates growth in the late 18
th century were a modest 0.24% per year, a finding that 
has generated some debate about whether or not there might have been a significant break from the past before the 
mid-19
th century.  Growth rates above 1% per year in real output per capita appeared in Britain only by the 1830s.   
40 See also Persson (1999).  
41 Clark (2002, 5).   30
efficiency, but these developments might not have been a source of growth so much as they were 
the result of it.   Thus, the sense in which efficiency precedes growth is qualified by the fact that 
there were many cross-border flows of ideas and people between Britain and the continent, and 
the increase in efficiency in Continental Europe occurs only after the British Industrial 
Revolution.  If market efficiency changes relatively quickly once the Industrial Revolution has 
started to take hold, our finding of high market efficiency would be to some extent a reflection, 
and not a cause of the Industrial Revolution. 
 
Conclusions 
The efficiency benefits that emerged from European institutions holds a prominent place 
in our understanding of economic growth, and it has also been offered as a leading explanation 
for why Europe succeeded to industrialize first.   In this paper we examine the similarities and 
differences in markets in pre-industrial China and Europe from the 17
th to 19
th centuries.  We use 
a range of methods to assess market efficiency in China and Europe in around 1770, to see 
whether we find one continent—specifically Europe—was clearly ahead.   
In the period right before the Industrial Revolution spread to Continental Europe, market 
efficiency was not uniformly better than they were elsewhere in the world that did not  
industrialize.  Over relatively short distances of 150 km or less, markets in continental Europe 
were more efficient.  This edge over other advanced parts of the world however, is relatively 
small when we consider what occurs right after the onset of industrialization.  In the early 19
th 
century, soon after the dates associated with the start of British industrialization, European 
markets become quickly and significantly more efficient than what had existed in prior centuries, 
and the level of efficiency was similar to Britain at the onset of its Industrial Revolution.  Secure   31
property rights, market-supporting institutions, and a well-functioning market economy may be 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for an industrial revolution. 
We find exceptionally well-performing markets in the times and places when we suspect 
that an industrial revolution was already under way and not before.  Thus, the improvements in 
the degree of market efficiency in the 19
th century in Western Europe may be largely a reflection 
of the process of industrialization.  This suggests not only that greater efficiency leads to growth, 
but that this process is endogenous as well (efficiency <=> growth).  If growth was a sudden 
process that influences market efficiency, this could also explain the sudden change.  
Even allowing that all other conditions in Britain were just right for modern growth, the 
findings do not rule out that the possibility that a third factor was responsible for triggering 
improvements in growth, and that market efficiency is a response to these changes.  Additional 
research is necessary to understand how institutional change occurs, and to explore how different 
institutional forms can be mapped into market outcomes.  A particularly interesting direction for 
future work is to identify the factors that are important for growth, and are really not reflected in 
market efficiency, but were very different between Europe and other parts of the world.   32
DATA APPENDIX: SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRICE SERIES 
 
Goods: In general, these are prices for rice in China and for wheat in Europe. The exception is China’s 
Hunan province, for which we have data on both rice and wheat. It has been used to confirm that the two 
grains do not fundamentally differ for the purposes of our analysis. Prices in China are for mid-quality 
rice; for Europe we do not have much specific information on quality, except for Bavaria (where 
sometimes red instead of white wheat was sold; the former is less expensive). The sources indicate that 
the quality of grains sold varied, and the price in Europe should be close to that for mid-quality wheat. 
 
Price determination: For both China and Europe, these are market prices, with the exception of the Navy 
Victualling series for London (see below). In Europe, the prices come typically from mercuriales, which 
are official records of transactions at public markets.  
 
Source and purpose of price records: In China, the data comes from price reports that prefects (the 
heads of prefectures, an administrative level above the county- and below the province-level) sent to the 
emperor in Beijing. Possibly, the empire-wide price reporting in China ensured a greater degree of 
comparability than in Europe. The main purpose of the recording of grain prices both in China and 
Europe was to prevent food crises. 
 
Characteristics of the recorded prices: The price series vary in terms of temporal as well as spatial 
aggregation. Most prices are at a monthly frequency, except for annual data for ten French regions 
(Labrousse 1932; see below). The calculation of the monthly price varied, but the three most important 
methods are (1) average price of first market day of month, (2) average price of all transactions in a 
month, and (3) minimum and maximum during a month. The price averages are typically not quantity-
weighted; however, we have used prices and quantities available at a weekly frequency (e.g. for Cologne 
and Munich) to compute the correct average prices, and found that the difference is negligible. If the 
minimum and maximum price is available, we form the average price as (min+max)/2.  
  There is spatial aggregation to a varying extent. For example, the average price for the Paris 
series comes from two markets in the city, and the price for the Bretagne series covers all markets in the 
Bretagne. For Chinese prefectures, the average price is computed as the average of the lowest price in any 
market of the prefecture, plus the highest price in any market, divided by two. The area of some 
prefectures is considerably larger than a city. To explore the influence of that, we have alternatively used 
the lowest price in the prefecture: this tends to be the market in the prefectural capital, so there is little if 
any spatial aggregation. These results did not differ much from the main results that are reported. 
Similarly, we have explored the effects of spatial aggregation in Europe, and did not find major effects. 
Gonzalo (1993) discusses the extent to which time series properties—order of integration, cointegration—
are preserved under temporal and cross-sectional (spatial) aggregation. 
 
Selection of markets: The sample for China includes virtually all markets in the 10 provinces for which 
rice was the major grain, which suggests that sample selection plays essentially no role. For Europe, our 
data tends to be for markets of relatively big and relatively rich cities, because it was these cities that 
spent the resources needed for price collection. For instance, the 50 French markets in Drame et al. 
(1991), see below, are selected from some 900 markets as those where the greatest quantities were sold. 
 
Missing data: There are substantial gaps in the sources; approximately 23 % (15%) is missing in an 
average Chinese (European) series. We have used the TRAMO (Time Series Regression with ARIMA 
Noise, Missing Observations and Outliers) program to interpolate series for which there was not too much 
missing data (Gomez and Maravall 1997). This estimation of data does not critically affect our results.   33
Austria-Vienna 
Source: Pribram, Alfred Francis. Materialien zur Geschichte der Preise und Löhne in Österreich, Volume 
I. Vienna: Carl Überreuters Verlag, 1938.  
Overall years: 1692 to 1914; frequency: monthly; method: quantity-weighted average of all market days. 
Quantity units: In “Wiener Metzen” (1692-1752), in “Niederösterreichen Landmetzen” (1752-1875), and 
in “100 Kilogram” (1875-1914). Conversion rates: 1 Wiener Metzen = 0.76 Niederösterreiche 
Landmetzen; 1 Niederösterreicher Landmetzen = 46.32 Kilogram. 
Monetary Units: “Kreuzer” (1692-1752); “Kreuzer Konventionsmünze” (1752-1812); “Kreuzer Wiener 
Währung” (1812-1858); “Kreuzer Österreichischer Währung” (1858-1897); “Heller Kronenwährung” 
(1898-1914). Conversion rates: 1 Gulden = 60 Kreuzer = 60 Kreuzer Konventionsmünze = 150 Kreuzer 
Wiener Währung = 105 Kreuzer Wiener Währung = 210 Heller Kronenwährung. 
Original source: “Marktprotokolle der Stadt Wien”. 
 
Belgium-Brussels  
Source: For years 1568-1696, 1728-1795: Craeybeckx, J., “De Prijzen van Graan en van Brood te 
Brussel”, in C. Verlinden (ed.) Dokumenten voor de Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en 
Brabant, Vol. I. Bruges: De Tempel, 1959. 
Source: For years 1800-1889: Vandenbroeke, C., “Brusselse Merkuriale van Granen, Aardappelen, Hooi, 
Stro, Boter, Vlees, Koolzaad, Boskool en Steenkol”, in C. Verlinden (ed.) Dokumenten voor de 
Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, Vol. III. Bruges: De Tempel, 1972. 
Overall years: 1568-1889, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average from the month’s first market 
day. 
Quantity units: In “Bruxelles setier” (1568-1696, 1728-1795); in “100 liters” (1800-1871), and in “100 
Kilograms” (1872-1889). Conversion rates: 1 Bruxelles setier = 48.76 liters, and 79 kilograms = 100 
liters. 
Monetary units: In “Brabantse stuivers” (1568-1696, 1728-1795); in “French Francs” (1800-1817, 1833-
1889), and in “Dutch Guilders” (1817-1832). Conversion rates: 20 Brabantse stuivers = 1 Dutch Guilder; 
and in 1816, 1 Dutch Guilder = 2.085 French Francs, and in 1832, 1 Dutch Guilder = 2.117 French 
Francs. 
Original source: “Algemeen Rijksarchief te Brussel, Terminatieboeken”. 
 
Belgium-Brugge 
Source: Vanderpijpen, W., “Brugse Merkuriale van Granen, Brood, Aardappelen, Boter en Vlees (1796-
1914)”, in C. Verlinden (ed.), Dokumenten voor de Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en 
Brabant, Vol. IV. Bruges: De Tempel, 1973.  
Overall years: 1796 to 1914, with few gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average from the month’s first 
market day. 
Quantity units: In “10 Kilograms” (1796-1802), in “100 liters” (1802-1890), and in “100 kilograms” 
(1892-1914). Conversion: 100 liter = 79 kilograms. 
Monetary units: In “French Francs” (1796-1817, 1833-1914), and in “Dutch Guilders” (1817-1832); see 
notes on Belgium-Brussels. 
Original sources: “Rijksarchief Brugge (R.A.B.), Leiedepartement, 1076-1080 en 2831-2846” (for 1796-
1812), and “Stadsarchief Brugge (S.A.B.), Gazette van Brugge” (for 1813-1914). 
 
Belgium—Aalst 
Source: Wyffels, A., “Prix du havot de froment à Alost”, in C. Verlinden (ed.), Dokumenten voor de 
Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, XV-XVIII
 Centuries, Bruges: De Tempel, 
1959. 
Overall years: 1729-1802, with major gaps before 1750; frequency: monthly; method: average, with 
variations. 
Quantity units: In “havot” (i.e., per barrel).   34
Monetary units: In “Gros de Flandre”. 




Source: Craeybeckx, J., “De Prijzen van granen en van brood te Antwerpen van 1608 tot 1817”, in C. 
Verlinden (ed.) Dokumenten voor de Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, Vol. 
I. Bruges: De Tempel, 1959. 
Overall years: 1608 to 1817; frequency: monthly; method: average price on first market day of each 
month. 
Quantity units: In Antwerp “Viertel”. 
Monetary units: In “Brabantse stuivers”. 









Source: Helin, E., Prix des Cereales a Luxembourg aux XVII
e et XVIII
e siecles, Universite de Louvain, 
1966; part of Joseph Ruwet et al. (1966), Marché des céréales à Ruremonde, Luxembourg, Namur et 
Diest aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Leuven: Presse de l’Universite de Louvain, 1966. 
Overall years: 1721 to 1794, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average of highest and lowest price 
on first market day of month, with some variation. 
Quantity units: In “bichet”, where 1 bichet (or setier) = 20.463 liters. 
Monetary units: In “Sous”, where 1 Luxemburg Gulden is equal to 20 sous. 
Original source: “Les Hallages de Luxembourg”. 
 
China--121 Prefectural capitals 
Source: Data collection by Carol H. Shiue. These are rice prices; the sample covers virtually all 
prefectures of 10 provinces in China’s Central/South-Central area; see Shiue (2002) as well as Roehner 
and Shiue (2000) for additional details. 
Overall years: 1742 to 1795, with gaps; frequency: monthly (collected and used: 2
nd and 8
th lunar month); 
method: highest and lowest price from all markets in a given prefecture. We take (highest price+lowest 
price)/2 as the average price in the prefectural capital. 
Quantity units: In “shi”, where 1 shi = about 103 liters.  
Monetary units: In “liang”, which is a Chinese silver currency; it is also called “tael”. 
Original source: Gongzhong liangjiadan [Grain price lists in the palace archives]. Number One Historical 
Archives, Beijing.  
 
China--13 Prefectural capitals from Hunan province 
Source: Data collection by Peter Perdue; these are prices for rice and for wheat; see Perdue (1987) and 
Wong and Perdue (1992) for additional findings on Hunan province. 
Overall years: 1736 to 1856, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method and units of account: see notes on 
China—121 Prefectural capitals. 
Original source: Gongzhong liangjiadan [Grain price lists in the palace archives]. Number One Historical 
Archives, Beijing.  
 
England-London 
Source: Beveridge, William H. B. Prices and Wages in England from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth 
Century, Volume 1, (Price Tables: Mercantile Era; first edition 1939). London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 
1965. 
Overall years: 1683 to 1801, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average from prices for spot or 
future (usually up to one month) delivery.   35
This series is conceptually different in that this series are not market, but British Navy procurement prices 
for grain. The Navy Victualling Board met daily to contract with dealers for the supply of provisions.  
There was a public announcement, after which the interested dealers were one-by-one asked to place their 
bid. The Navy tried to achieve the competitive market price outcome (for instance, indications of 
collusion among bidders resulted in the postponement of procurement activity). See pp.514-535 for 
details. 
Quantity units: In “Quarters”. Monetary units: In “Shillings”.  
 
England-London and 40 Counties 
Source: The London Gazette. 
Overall years: 1770 to 1794, with gaps; frequency: we employ data for the months January, March, July, 
and September (the source reports prices every week); method: average price of first week of month. 
Quantity units: In “Standard Winchester Bushel of 8 gallons” (1770-93), and in “Standard Winchester 
Quarter of 8 bushels” (1793-94). 
Monetary units: In “Shillings” and “pence”. 
 
France-Paris 
Source: Baulant, Micheline and Jean Meuvret. Prix des céréales extraits de la mercuriale de Paris. Paris: 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 1960. 
Overall years: 1520 to 1698; frequency: monthly; method: average of maximum and minimum price on 
the first market day of month.   
Quantity units: In “setier de Paris”, where 1 setier = 156 liter.  
Monetary Units: In “Livres turnois”. 
Original source: “Mercuriale de Paris”. 
 
France-Toulouse 
Source: Bertrand Roehner’s preparation of figures in Frêche, Georges and Geneviève Frêche. Les prix des 
grains, des vins et des legumes à Toulouse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967. 
Overall years: 1486 to 1913; frequency: monthly; method: average of first market day of the month. 
Quantity units: In “Hectoliter” (one hectoliter = 100 liter). 
Monetary units: In “French Francs and Centimes”. 
Conversions: The Frêche-Frêche data is in different quantity and monetary units for different periods; we 
have followed the conversion rates applied in Drame et al. (1991). 
Original source: “Mercuriale de Toulouse”.  
 
France-Alençon, Amiens, Bourges, Bourgogne, Bretagne, Caen, Lyon, Riom, Rouen, Tours  
Source: Labrousse, C.E. Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au 18e siècle. Paris: 
Paris C. 1932. See Roehner and Shiue (2000) for additional details.  
Overall years: 1756 to 1790, 1806 to 1900; frequency: annually; method: average. If the price is given for 
a region (e.g. Bretagne), we use the location of the central city of the region. Note that administrative 
boundaries were partly redefined during the French Revolution. 
Quantity units: In “setier de Paris” (1756-1790), and in “Hectoliter” (1806-1900); conversion: one setier 
de Paris = 156 liters. 
Monetary units: In “100 livres” (1756-1790), and in “French Centimes”; conversion: 100 Centimes = 1 
Francs = 1 livre. 
 
France-50 cities in French departements  
Source: Drame, Sylvie, Christian Gonfalone, Judith A. Miller, and Bertrand Roehner. Un Siècle de 
Commerce du Blé en France, 1825-1913. Paris: Economica, 1991.  
Overall years: 1825 to 1913; frequency: every 15 days (1825-1903), and every month (1903-1913); 
method: quantity-weighted average from all market days in a given period (15 days, or a month).   36
Quantity units: In “Hectoliters”. 
Monetary units: In “French Centimes”, where 100 Centimes = 1 French Francs. 
Original source: Archives Nationales (Paris), F




Source: Ebeling, Dietrich and Franz Irsigler, “Getreideumsatz, Getreide- und Brotpreise in Köln 1368-
1797, Erster Teil: Getreideumsatz und Getreidepreise: Wochen-, Monats- und Jahrestabelle”, in H. 
Stehkämper (ed.), Mitteilungen aus dem Stadtarchiv von Köln, Vol. 65-66.  Köln-Wien: Böhlau-Verlag, 
1976.  
Overall years: 1368 to 1797, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average from 4 to 5 weekly prices. 
The source also lists weekly prices and quantities, which allows verifying that the difference between 
quantity-weighted and –unweighted monthly price is typically less than one percent. 
Quantity units: In “Kölner Malter”, which is approximately 150 liters or about 117 kilograms. 
Monetary units: In “Albus”; conversions: 1 Albus = 12 Heller, where the value of Albus to Gulden and 
Mark is 1 Gulden = 4 Mark = 24 Albus. 
Original sources: “Die Fruchtpreisbücher von 1531-1674”, “Die Bäckerbescheidbücher von 1658-1773”, 
and “Das Preise- und Umsatzverzeichnis von 1773-1797”. 
 
Germany- Rostock, Schwerin, Wismar, Boizenburg, Parchim, and Grabow 
Source: Die Getreidepreise im Grossherzogthum Mecklenburg-Schwerin während des Zeitraums von 
1771 bis 1870, Beiträge zur Statistik Mecklenburgs. Schwerin: Mecklenburg-Schwerin Statistisches 
Landesamt, 1873.  
Overall years: 1771 to 1870, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average of mid-price of all market 
days in a month.  
Quantity units: For Rostock and Schwerin in “Rostocker Scheffel” (RS); for Wismar in “Wismarer 
Scheffel” (WS); for Grabow and Parchim in “Maass” (M); and quantity units in Boizenburg are “ ¼ 
Sack” (¼ S). Conversions: 1 WS = 1.023331 RS, 1 M = 1.436 RS, and ¼ S = 1.077 RS, where 1 RS = 
0.385371 Hectoliter. 
Monetary units: In “Ganzen und Zehntel-Schillingen Courant” (i.e., in Courant, with decimals).  
Original source: “Mecklenburgische Anzeigen” (a newspaper). 
 
Germany-Munich  
Source: Elsas, Moritz John. Umriss einer Geschichte der Preise und Löhne in Deutschland vom 
ausgehenden Mittelalter bis zum Beginn des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1936.  
Overall years: 1690 to 1820, with gaps after 1779; frequency: monthly; method: average price of first 
market day of the month. 
Quantity units: In “Scheffel”, where 1 Scheffel = about 223 liters. 
Monetary units: In “Alten (schwarzen) Rechnungspfennigen”. 
Original source: “Schrannenzettel” of the city of Munich. 
 
Germany—Augsburg, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Erding, Kempten, Landshut, Lindau, Memmingen, 
Munich, Nördlingen, Nürnberg, Regensburg, Straubing, Würzburg, Zweibrücken 
Source: Seuffert, Georg Karl Leopold.  Statistik des Getreide- und Viktualien-Handels im Königreiche 
Bayern mit Berücksichtigung des Auslandes.  München: J.G. Weiss, 1857.  
Overall years: 1815 to 1855 (Munich: 1790 to 1855); frequency: monthly; method: average price of all 
market days in a month. For Munich, the Seuffert (1857) source also contains weekly prices (for each 
Saturday). In principle, those are the prices listed in Elsas (1936); a comparison of the two sources 
essentially confirms that, also suggesting that these prices are highly accurate. 
Quantity units: In “Bavarian Scheffel”. 
Monetary units: In “Gulden and Kreuzer”; 1 Gulden = 60 Kreuzer; conversion to prices for Munich from 
Elsas (1936): 1 Kreuzer = 3.5 “Alte Rechnungspfennige”.   37
 
Italy-Siena 
Source: Parente, Giuseppe. Prezzi e Mercato del Grano Siena 1546-1765. Florence: Carlo Cya, 1942. 
Overall years: 1546 to 1765, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average from all prices of the 
month. 
Quantity units: In “Staio Senese”; 1 Staio Senese = 22.84 liters. 
Monetary units: In “Soldi”; this source gives conversion factors to compute constant prices. They are for 
the years 1542-1557: 0.23240; for the years 1558-1676: 0.22288; for the years 1677-1738: 0.21419; and 
for 1739-1766, the conversion factor is 0.18912. We have experimented with both current and constant 
prices, finding that the results are similar. 
Original source: “Archivio degli Esecutori della Gabella”, Archives of the State of Siena, documents # 
1283 to 1290. 
 
The Netherlands-Utrecht 
Source: Sillem, Jérome Alexandre. Tabellen van Marktprijzen van Granen te Utrecht in de Jaren 1393 tot 
1644,Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Johannes Müller: 
Amsterdam, 1901; a supplement with the 18
th and 19
th century figures is published in Posthumus, N.W., 
Inquiry into the history of prices in Holland, E.J. Brill: Leiden, 1964.   
Overall years: 1534-1644, 1760-1814; frequency: monthly; average of all prices for a given month. 
Quantity units: In “Modius"; 1 Modius = 88.93 kilograms. 
Original source: “Rekeningen en weeklijsten der Domprossdij”. 
 
The Netherlands-Nijmegen  
Source: Tijms, W. Historia Agriculturae. Groningen: Nederlands Agronomisch-Historisch Instituut, 
1977. 
Overall years: 1558-1916, with gaps; frequency: monthly; method: average price of the first market day 
of each month. 
Quantity units: In “Malder” (1558-1822), and in “Hectoliter” (1824-1916); conversion: 1 Malder = 
166.88 liter = 1.6688 Hectoliter. 
Monetary Units: In “Guldens” (Dutch Guilders). 
 
The Netherlands-Ruremonde 
Source: Ruwet, J., F. Ladrier, E. Helin, and L. van Buyten (1966),  Marché des céréales à Ruremonde, 
Luxembourg, Namur et Diest aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Leuven: Presse de l’Universite de Louvain, 
1966. 
Overall years: 1599 to 1796; frequency: monthly; method: average of minimum and maximum of the first 
market day of each month. 
Quantity units: In “Malder”, where 1 Malder is about 170 liters (a range from 164.7 to 174.5 is given, 
p.17). 
Monetary units: In “Stuivers”, which in French are “patards”.   38
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 Table 1.  Data Sources
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Country Location Source Frequency Years Method Max/Min Spatial Quantity
Obs.  Aggregate Weighted 
Austria Vienna Pribram (1938) Monthly 1692-1914 Average no no yes
Belgium Brussels Verlinden (1959) Monthly 1568-1696 First day no no no
Verlinden (1972) Monthly 1728-95,1800-89 First day no no no
Bruges Verlinden (1973) Monthly 1796-1914 First day no no no
Verlinden (1959,1973Monthly 1564-1604 Avg./1st day no no no
Diksmuide Verlinden (1959) Monthly 1482-1615 Average no no no
Aalst Verlinden (1959) Monthly 1750-1802 Average no no no
Antwerp Verlinden (1959) Monthly 1608-1817 First day no no no
China Hunan  province (13 pref.)* see Perdue (1987) Monthly 1738-1858 First day yes yes no
121 Prefectures see Shiue (2002) Monthly 1742-1795 First day yes yes no
Anhwei province (13 pref.) "
Fujian  province (12 pref.) "
Guangdong  province (13 pref.) "
Guangxi  province (13 pref.) "
Guizhou  province (12 pref.) "
Hubei  province (10 pref.) "
Hunan  province (13 pref.) "
Jiangsu province (10 pref.) "
Jiangxi  province (14 pref.) "
Zhejiang  province (11 pref.) "
England London Beveridge (1965) Monthly 1683-1801 Average no no no
London and 40 Counties London Gazette Weekly 1770-1794 Weekly avg. no yes no
France Toulouse Freche (1967) Monthly 1486-1913 First day no no in part
Paris Baulant (1960) Monthly 1520-1698 First day yes no no
10 Generalite (Regions) Labrousse (1932) Annual 1756-90,1806-1900 Average no in part in part
50 Cities, 48 Departments Drame (1991) Biweekly 1825-1903 First day no yes yes
Germany Cologne Ebeling (1976) Monthly 1531-1797 Average no no no
6 Cities Mecklenburg-Schwerin Mecklenburg (1873) Monthly 1770-1870 Average no no no
14 Cities in Bavaria Seuffert (1857) Monthly 1815-1855 Average no no no
Munich Elsas (1936) Monthly 1790-1855 First day no no no
Italy Siena Parenti (1942) Monthly 1546-1765 Average no no no
Luxembourg Luxembourg Ruwet (1966) Monthly 1722-1795 Variable in part no no
Netherlands Nijmegen Tijms (1977) Monthly 1558-1916 First day start 1814 no no
Utrecht Sillem (1901) Monthly 1534-1647 Average no no no
Posthumus (1964) Monthly 1774-1814 Average no no no
Ruremonde Ruwet (1966) Monthly 1599-1796 First day yes no in part
Notes:
Column VI indicates whether the prices were calculated from the first market day of the month or with a temporal averaging method. 
Column VII indicates if the data records a range of prices, ie, typically the minimum and maximum prices observed. 
Column VIII notes if spatial aggregation is involved; these cases are only relevant for regions larger than a city market, such as departments or prefectures. 
Column IX indicates if price averages have been quantity-weighted in the original source.  
*Hunan series of monthly prices for both rice and wheat. Table 2a.   Price Correlations in China and Europe 1742-1794 in 25 year periods
Dist range 1742-1766 1756-1780 1766-1790 1770-1794
Country Sample N* in km n** Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev
China Yangzi Delta 9 <150 25 0.76 0.15 0.80 0.10 0.84 0.05 0.83 0.07
9 150-300 11 0.73 0.13 0.74 0.08 0.81 0.04 0.81 0.06
Yangzi D. expanded 26 <150 85 0.77 0.12 0.75 0.11 0.80 0.09 0.78 0.10
26 150-300 138 0.67 0.15 0.68 0.11 0.71 0.11 0.70 0.12
26 300-450 76 0.54 0.20 0.56 0.16 0.65 0.09 0.66 0.11
26 450-600 26 0.44 0.17 0.53 0.17 0.59 0.09 0.67 0.13
Provincial Capitals 10 <150 0 --- --- --- ---
10 150-300 8 0.58 0.11 0.49 0.24 0.64 0.25 0.59 0.24
10 300-450 7 0.53 0.20 0.50 0.32 0.61 0.33 0.61 0.36
10 450-600 8 0.53 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.38 0.31
10 600-750 6 0.32 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.41 0.31 0.35
10 750-900 6 0.38 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.30 0.15 0.34
10 900-1050 2 0.35 0.17 0.03 0.17 -0.10 0.08 -0.14 0.15
10 >1050 8 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.08 0.22
Yangzi River 34 <150 68 0.78 0.12 0.77 0.11 0.82 0.07 0.81 0.09
34 150-300 124 0.68 0.14 0.69 0.12 0.75 0.09 0.74 0.12
34 300-450 146 0.58 0.16 0.60 0.13 0.68 0.10 0.68 0.10
34 450-600 120 0.54 0.16 0.55 0.13 0.65 0.09 0.66 0.09
34 600-750 57 0.51 0.15 0.45 0.14 0.64 0.12 0.64 0.10
34 750-900 34 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.11 0.61 0.11 0.61 0.11
34 900-1050 12 0.42 0.13 0.31 0.11 0.56 0.08 0.57 0.08
England London+40 counties 41 <150 328 --- --- --- 0.87 0.06
41 150-300 343 --- --- --- 0.77 0.06
41 300-450 133 --- --- --- 0.71 0.07
41 450-600 16 --- --- --- 0.71 0.08
France Central France 10 <150 10 --- 0.88 0.04 0.80 0.09 0.80 0.09
10 150-300 13 --- 0.82 0.07 0.70 0.15 0.74 0.14
10 300-450 14 --- 0.74 0.07 0.58 0.09 0.65 0.09
10 450-600 8 --- 0.74 0.07 0.55 0.08 0.63 0.08
Europe {Mecklenburg(3), 15 <150 17 --- --- --- 0.83 0.09
Belgium(3),London, 15 150-300 15 --- --- --- 0.65 0.15
France(1),Austria(1), 15 300-450 13 --- --- --- 0.55 0.21
Germany(2), 15 450-600 20 --- --- --- 0.53 0.17
Luxembourg, 15 600-750 14 --- --- --- 0.39 0.15
Netherlands(2), 15 750-900 11 --- --- --- 0.33 0.16
Ruremonde}. 15 900-1050 10 --- --- --- 0.30 0.09
15 >1050 5 --- --- --- 0.30 0.10
* Gives the number of markets in a sample
** Gives the number of bilateral relations in a specific distance rangeTable 2b.   Price Correlation in Europe 1692-1716 and 1806-1855 in 25 year periods. 
Dist range 1692-1716 1806-1830 1815-1834 1825-1849 1831-1855
Country Sample N* in km n** Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev Mean stdev
France Central France 10 <150 10 --- 0.96 0.02 0.97 0.02 0.96 0.02 0.98 0.01
10 150-300 13 --- 0.93 0.03 0.95 0.02 0.94 0.03 0.97 0.01
10 300-450 14 --- 0.90 0.02 0.91 0.03 0.89 0.04 0.95 0.02
10 >450 8 --- 0.87 0.04 0.88 0.03 0.84 0.03 0.94 0.01
France 51 <150 140 --- --- 0.91 0.07 0.94 0.05
51 150-300 344 --- --- --- 0.87 0.06 0.91 0.05
51 300-450 321 --- --- --- 0.82 0.07 0.88 0.05
51 450-600 276 --- --- --- 0.75 0.08 0.83 0.06
51 600-750 155 --- --- --- 0.71 0.08 0.81 0.06
51 <750 39 --- --- --- 0.70 0.05 0.79 0.03
Germany Bavaria 13 <150 37 --- --- 0.98 0.01 0.97 0.02 0.98 0.02
13 150-300 41 --- --- 0.96 0.02 0.93 0.03 0.95 0.02
Bavaria & 20 <150 65 --- --- 0.97 0.02 0.96 0.02 0.97 0.02
Mecklenburg 20 150-300 40 --- --- 0.95 0.02 0.93 0.03 0.95 0.02
20 300-450 18 --- --- 0.81 0.05 0.78 0.06 0.84 0.05
20 450-600 42 --- --- 0.76 0.04 0.73 0.04 0.78 0.04
20 600-750 25 --- --- 0.74 0.04 0.71 0.03 0.75 0.05
Europe {Belgium(2), 15 <150 8 --- --- --- 0.97 0.01 0.96 0.03
France(4), 15 150-300 9 --- --- --- 0.90 0.06 0.94 0.03
Germany(4), 15 300-450 9 --- --- --- 0.78 0.10 0.85 0.07
Mecklenburg(3) 15 450-600 22 --- --- --- 0.77 0.08 0.83 0.06
Austria(1), 15 600-750 25 --- --- --- 0.72 0.09 0.78 0.08
Netherlands(1)} 15 750-900 12 --- --- --- 0.69 0.05 0.74 0.02
15 900-1050 10 --- --- --- 0.69 0.05 0.72 0.04
15 1050-1200 10 --- --- --- 0.54 0.11 0.57 0.12
Europe {Belgium(1), 9 <150 4 0.89 0.03 --- --- --- ---
France(1), 9 150-300 2 0.88 0.06 --- --- --- ---
London,Italy(1), 9 300-450 4 0.55 0.27 --- --- --- ---
Austria(1), 9 450-600 5 0.29 0.24 --- --- --- ---
Germany(2), 9 600-750 3 0.43 0.08 --- --- --- ---
Netherlands(2)} 9 750-900 5 0.46 0.09 --- --- --- ---
9 900-1050 10 0.4 0.16 --- --- --- ---
9 1050-1200 3 0.36 0.09 --- --- --- ---
* Gives the number of markets in a sample
** Gives the number of bilateral relations in a specific distance rangeTable 3. Distance slope coefficients in China and Europe, 1742-1855 in 25 year periods. 
Dist range 1742-1766 1756-1780 1766-1790 1770-1794
Country Sample N* in km n** Slope R-sqr Slope R-sqr Slope R-sqr Slope R-sqr
Shorter Distances
China Yangzi Delta 12 10 - 300 36 -0.06** 0.06 -0.06** 0.13 -0.03*** 0.11 -0.03** 0.10
England England without Wales 41 10 - 300 671 --- --- --- -0.11*** 0.56
Medium Distances
China Yangzi D. expanded 26 100 - 550 285 -0.20** 0.24 -0.16** 0.23 -0.13*** 0.23 -0.10*** 0.56
England England without Wales 41 100 - 550 649 --- --- --- -0.13*** 0.45
France Central France 10 100 - 550 37 --- -0.15** 0.35 -0.26* 0.39 -0.17** 0.35
Longer Distances
China Provincial Capitals 10 200 - 1400 45 -0.22** 0.376 -0.27* 0.27 -0.42* 0.37 -0.39* 0.33




Dist range 1806-1830 1815-1834 1825-1849 1831-1855
Country Sample N* in km n** Slope R-sqr Slope R-sqr Slope R-sqr Slope R-sqr
Shorter Distances
Germany Bavaria 13 10 - 300 77 --- -0.023*** 0.36 -0.042** 0.52 -0.03** 0.48
Medium Distances
France France 51 100 - 550 942 --- --- -0.10*** 0.29 -0.06** 0.22
Germany Bavaria &Mecklenburg 20 100 - 550 108 --- -0.14*** 0.79 -0.16*** 0.79 -0.12*** 0.77
Longer Distances
Europe {Mecklenburg(3),France(4) 15 200 - 1400 93 --- --- -0.18** 0.44 -0.21** 0.57
Belgium(2),Austria(1),
Germany(5),Netherlands(1)}
* Gives the number of markets in a sample
** Gives the number of bilateral relations in a specific distance rangeTable 4: Engle-Granger Cointegration Results
Europe 15 markets England 40 county markets + London
Distance class Mean ADF S.e. of Mean Median ADF Mean ADF S.e. of Mean Median ADF
(km) t-stat* t-stat t-stat* t-stat
0<x<150 -4.450 0.131 -4.382 -4.582 0.031 -4.577
150<x<300 -3.807 0.113 -3.757 -4.450 0.031 -4.451
300<x<450 -3.757 0.145 -3.766 -4.382 0.058 -4.392
450<x<600 -3.493 0.103 -3.375 -4.464 0.186 -4.254
600<x<750 -3.163 0.190 -2.853
750<x<900 -3.604 0.186 -3.533
900<x -3.582 0.169 -3.498


































































































































































































































Figure 4. China and Europe, selected markets over 18th and 19th centuries
Bilateral correlation on distance
Kilometers
European Cities 1770-1794
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China Yangzi Delta Prefectures 1742-95 European Cities 1825-49Appendix A: Estimation of Cointegrating Relationships using Maximum Likelihood 
 
  This method, developed by Johansen (1988), is based on systems vector autoregression 
(VAR) analysis.  Consider the case of a first-order VAR: 
(A.1)   , 1 1 t t t p A p ε + = −  
where pt is the ( 1 × n ) vector (p1t, …,pnt)’, εt is the ( 1 × n ) vector (ε1t, …,εnt)’, and A1 is a  ( n n× ) 
matrix of parameters. Assume that all elements of yt are known to be integrated of order 1 (I(1)). 
Subtracting pt-1 from (A.1) and letting I be an ( n n× ) identity matrix yields 












1 1  
Here π is the ( n n× ) matrix  () 1 A I − −  and πij is the element in row i and column j of π.  
 
In equation (A.2),  t p ∆  and  t ε  are stationary while  1 − t p  is non-stationary, which means 
that for consistency the matrix π must be less than of full rank (denoted by r). This appendix 
considers only the case of  2 = n , which means that r is either 0 or 1.  If the rank of π is equal to 
zero, all elements πij are equal to zero and (A.2) becomes 
(A.3)   . 1 t t t t t p p p ε ε + = ⇔ = ∆ −  
In this case, there is no linear combination of the elements of pt that is stationary, or, p1t and p2t 
are not cointegrated.  Alternatively, if  1 = r , there is one cointegrating vector given by either row 
of π.  Each sequence {} it p  can be written in error-correction form (given by A.2) with non-zero 
parameters πij (Granger’s representation theorem).   
 
A normalization with respect to p1t-1 allows to write the system (A.2) in terms of 
parameters α and β; let  11 1 π α =  and  11 /π π β ij ij = . The equation for  t p1 ∆ , e.g., then reads 
(A.4)   ( ) . 1 1 2 12 1 1 1 1 t t t t p p p ε β α + + = ∆ − −  
In the long-run, the {} it p  will satisfy the relationship 
(A.5)   0 2 12 1 = + t t p p β . 
Equation (A.5) corresponds to the cointegrating relationship for Engle and Granger’s (1987) 
model discussed in the text, while the parameter α in equation (A.4) governs the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium.  An attractive feature of Johansen’s (1988) method is that under 
certain assumptions, one can estimate both the long-run parameters and the short-run parameters 
by one-step maximum likelihood.
1 
 
In summary, the Johansen method involves estimating the rank of the matrix π. In the 
present context, if the rank of π is equal to 0, there is no cointegration, while if it is equal to 1, 
the two series are cointegrated.
2  The Johansen approach is relatively restrictive, for instance, the 
errors must be Gaussian (in contrast, Engle and Granger’s 1987 method does not rely on that).  
                                                 
1 Also Engle and Granger’s method allows estimating the speed-of-adjustment parameters, in a second step. 
2 Johansen’s method can also be used in the case of higher-order integration and n>2.  
At the same time, Johansen’s method is also powerful in the sense that when it is appropriate, it 






Consider the prefectures Huizhou and Taicang, both located in the expanded Yangzi 
delta, China’s most developed area in the 18
th century.  Huizhou is located in Anhwei province, 
and Taicang is located in Jiangsu province, with a distance of about 286 kilometers between 
them.  Taicang is located right on the mouth of the Yangzi River, while Huizhou is further west, 
and although it is not located directly on the Yangzi River, it is not far from it. 
 
Let the log rice price in Huizhou be denoted by p1t, while Taicang’s is given by p2t.  
Figure A1 (“Huizhou Prefecture”) and Figure A2 (“Taicang Prefecture”) show these price series 
both in levels (on top) and in first differences.  The plots suggest that the price levels are non-
stationary while the first-differences are stationary, and formal tests confirm this.  Cointegration 
means that there is a linear long-run relationship between the two prices (plus, we allow for a 
constant, β3, in the cointegration space): 
(A.6)   0 3 2 2 1 1 = + + β t t y B y B  
We perform a number of auxiliary tests that explore whether the price series seem to be 
suited for an application of Johansen’s technique, and which particular model seems most 
appropriable.
4  As an example, Figure A3 (“Diagnostic Analysis for Differenced Taicang Price 
Series”) shows some basic characteristics and tests for the differenced Taicang series that help to 
determine which model should be estimated. Based on this analysis, we make a number of 
modifications to the base specification.  First, we add a seasonal effect that controls for price 
differences by month (spring or fall), and a number of indicator variables that eliminate the effect 
of outliers.  We denote these deterministic components by  t D .  Second, we include the once-
lagged differences of  t p ∆ , that is,  1 − ∆ t p .  The resulting specification is given by 
(A.7)   t t t t t D p p p ε + Φ + Γ∆ + Π = ∆ − − 1 1 , 
where Γ and Φ are  2 2×  matrices of parameters. If the rank of Π  is equal to 0, there is no 
cointegration, whereas if it is equal to one, the series are cointegrated.  The elements of the Π  
matrix are products ofα ’s andβ ’s, which are the short-run and long-run coefficients, 
respectively, of the price equilibrium. 
To determine the rank of the Π  matrix, recall that the rank of a matrix is equal to the 
number of its eigenvalues that are different from zero. Johansen has developed several tests to 
determine whether—with n = 2—one eigenvalue is sufficiently far away from zero so that one 
                                                 
3 This is not meant to be representative; while we have studied cointegration among many prefectures using 
Johansen’s technique, we have not done so for all 7260 bilateral relations. However, see the Engle-Granger results 
based on all 7260 bilateral relations in Figure 11 above. 
4 These tests analyze the degree of serial and cross-series correlation, whether the errors appear to be normally 
distributed, and whether there appears to be autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects. The 
models that we consider differ in (i) what lag length (the number of differenced lags on the right hand side) to use, 
(ii) whether to include seasonal effects and other deterministic components, (iii) how to identify and to treat outliers, 
and other factors. See Maddala and Kim (1998) for a discussion.   48
can conclude that the rank of the Π  matrix is one. The larger eigenvalue of the matrix Π  in 
equation (A.7) is estimated to be 0.254, with a (‘trace’) test statistic of 52.51. The relevant 
critical value for the trace test is far lower than that (with a value of 17.79), which means that r = 
1 is accepted, that is, the two series are cointegrated.
46  Figure A4 (“The Estimated Cointegrating 
vector between the Huizhou and Taicang Price Series”) shows the estimated cointegrating vector 
t t p B p B 2 2 1 1 + .  The difference between the top and the bottom part of the figure is that the 
bottom takes the deterministic components and the lagged difference  1 − ∆ t p  into account whereas 
the top does not.  The plots suggest that at least for the larger parts of the time series, the 
estimated linear combination of the two prices is stationary. 
 
A second question that can be addressed is whether an adjusted law of one price is 
holding among these prefectures.  Normalizing equation (A.6) by setting B1 to 1—the parameter 
B1 and B2 are not separately identified—this amounts to testing whether in the long-run, B2 is 
equal to 1, or, the price in Huizhou is equal to the price in Taicang (up to the constant β3). In that 
case, (A.6) becomes  3 2 1 β − = t t p p . 
In the unrestricted regression, B2 is estimated at 0.989, and consequently, the hypothesis 
that B2 = 1 cannot be rejected at a 5% level (p-value of 3%).  This means that there is evidence 
for the (adjusted) law of one price. Moreover, the constant  3 β  is estimated to equal 0.048, 
suggesting that the long-run price in Taicang, at the mouth of the Yangzi, is above the long-run 
price in Huizhou.  The finding is very plausible, because on average, grain prices in China were 
increasing as one moves from the inland regions of China’s west down the river to the larger 
cities of the Yangzi Delta. 
 
Turning to the short-run dynamics, there are two questions of interest: first, do prices in 
both markets respond to the respective other price, or is it primarily the change in one price that 
brings the markets back to long-run equilibrium?  This depends on the signs of the coefficients 
α . In this case,  1 α , in the  t p1 ∆  equation, is estimated to be significantly negative, whereas  2 α  in 
the  t p2 ∆  equation is positive. This is plausible because stability of the long-run equilibrium 
requires that an above-equilibrium value of y1t triggers a subsequent decline of p1t ( 1 α  negative), 
and/or a below-equilibrium value of p2t triggers a rise in p2t ( 2 α  positive). Here, adjustment 
towards the equilibrium works through both markets (neither of the market prices is weakly 
exogenous).  
 
The second question is: how long does it take until a shock to the long-run equilibrium is 
absorbed?  This can be gauged by looking at the size of the α ’s. The point estimates for  1 α  and 
2 α  are -0.228 and 0.291, respectively.  These numbers, of around 0.25 in absolute value, 
translate into a half-life of a shock of about 0.5 years for these two markets.
47 For comparison, 
Persson (1999, 98-100) estimates comparable half-lives for a number of grain markets in Europe 
                                                 
46 The exact critical value for this test might be somewhat different, both because it is an asymptotic value (here, 
T=108), and because we include some additional deterministic components. In any case, given the large test statistic 
of 52.51 (relative to the approximate critical value of 17.79), qualitatively, this will not matter. 
47 We use prices at semi-annual frequency (one period lasts six months). At the same time, note that we use monthly 
data, the same frequency that is employed for the European estimates discussed in the following; Gonzalo (1993) 
and Taylor (2001) discuss the consequences of temporal aggregation for the properties of some estimators.  
and finds that the duration in the 16
th to 18
th centuries was 1 ½ to 3 years; and the half life of a 
price deviation does not fall to 3 to 4 months until the mid-19th century. 
 
 
Appendix B: Comparing historical weather patterns in China and Europe 
 
  For China, the weather data available to us is an indicator of rainfall and wetness in a 
given harvest year. Systematic rainfall recording began as early as the Tang Dynasty (618-907 
A.D.), and from at least the 17th century the collection of rainfall and weather reports at the 
county level had become standard government practice (Wilkinson 1969). Our source for 
historical weather data are the weather maps in the State Meteorological Administration (1981). 
The maps give weather data throughout China for each year for 120 ''stations'', where one station 
corresponds to one or two of our prefectures. It is a discrete indicator of the degree of rainfall 
relative to what is considered normal for that region. The indicator, Rnt, ranges from 1 (severe 
droughts) to 5 (heavy rains and floods), and normal conditions are given by Rnt=3.  The 
information is hand-coded from the weather maps to compute the weather correlations between 
any two prefectures. 
 
  For Western and Central Europe before 1300 A.D., there are reports of natural disasters, 
and by 1800 A.D. there are almost complete descriptions of monthly weather, although cross-
border (international network) weather observations before 1860 were still rare (Pfister 2002). 
The exact relationship between climate and agricultural output is complicated, but it is clear that 
both extreme temperatures as well as extreme humidity tend to lead to bad harvests. Moreover, 
humidity and temperatures in different years or in different cities are correlated.
7 This means that 
we can employ the temperature data for 8 European cities available to us to compare the spatial 
weather patterns in Europe with those in China.
8 For each of the eight European cities, we have 
re-classified the weather data from temperature in degrees Celsius into five discrete classes, 1 to 
5, and computed for each city pair the correlation of weather.
9 
 
  The regressions presented in Table B1 compare weather correlations in China and Europe 
as a function of distance. We see that throughout weather correlations in Europe were higher 
than they were in China, indicated by the higher intercepts for the former sample (China: 0.39 to 
0.62, versus 0.83 to 1.17 for Europe). This in itself suggests that our evidence on price 
correlation might be affected by spatial patterns of weather (and not of arbitrage and trade) to a 
relatively greater extent in Europe, or put differently, without controlling for weather we have 
stacked the odds against finding China ahead in terms of market efficiency. However, it may be 
that the spatial correlation of humidity (used for China) and of temperature (used for Europe) is 
just different, and this may explain in part why we estimate a higher level of weather correlations 
for Europe. 
 
                                                 
7 See Baten (2000) for more discussion. 
8 The temperature data was provided by Rüdiger Glaser (see Glaser 2001); thanks to Jörg Baten for sharing the data 
with us. The cities are Paris, Vienna, Munich, De Bilt (the Netherlands), Nottingham (as Central England), Berlin, 
Basle (as Switzerland), and Stockholm (as Sweden). 
9 We replicate the frequencies that are present in the data for China (1770-1794): Rnt=1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 with 
probabilities of 5.7%, 28.1%, 46.5%, 15.3%, and 4.5%, respectively.  
  Another question thus is how weather correlations changed with distance in the two 
continents. It turns out that there is no clear difference between China and Europe. In the 
preferred specification for the European sample (in terms of 
2 R ), we estimate a value of -0.243 
on log distance for Europe, while for China it is smaller in absolute value (at -0.195). However, 
the 95% confidence interval of the estimate for Europe is (-0.310, -0.177), which covers the 
point estimate for China. Moreover, one may want to drop Stockholm from the sample because 
its location is substantially to the North of our core price series sample. That alone brings the 
distance coefficient rises to -0.186, less in absolute value than the estimate for China while at the 
same time increasing the 
2 R  (see specifications 4 and 2a, respectively). In addition, the 
preferred specification for the Chinese sample has both log distance and its square, and for this 
specification distance has the expected effects for China (linear: negative, squared: positive), 
while for Europe distance has no significant effect. 
 
On the bottom of the table, the predicted level of weather correlations in China and 
Europe is reported based on the OLS regressions. It is clear from these figures that the predicted 
weather correlation in Europe was higher than in China, while if one focuses on changes in 




Overall, this analysis shows that the influence of weather is unlikely to favor China over 
Europe in our comparison. First, the changes in weather accompanied by changes in distance 
were comparable in China and Europe. Second, we estimate that the level of weather correlations 
was substantially stronger in Europe than in China, and to the extent that this is not entirely due 
to differences in temperature versus humidity patterns, the analysis tends to favor Europe over 
China. 
 
                                                 
10 Finally, the remaining two specifications indicate that our results do not seem to be driven by the particulars of 
China’s weather distribution during 1770-94 (specification 5) or the fact that the minimum bilateral distance in our 
China is smaller than in our European sample (12 kilometers versus 265 kilometers; specification 6). Figure A.1.  Huizhou Prefecture 
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 Figure A.3   Diagnostic Analysis for Differenced Taicang Price Series 
 
Actual and Fitted for DL94











































 Figure A.4  The Estimated Cointegrating Vector between the Huizhou and Taicang Price Series. 
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 Table B.1: The spatial correlation of weather in Europe and China, 1770 to 1794
Dependent variable: Bilateral weather correlation
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4) (5) (6)
Europe Europe China
China Europe China Europe China Europe w/o Stockholm Alt. Dist'n*** Distance > 265 km
Intercept 0.392** 0.832** 0.539** 1.116** 0.628** 0.890* 1.024** 1.166** 0.591**




Log Distance -0.197** -0.243** -0.362** -0.026 -0.186** -0.260** -0.354**
(0.005) (0.032) (0.022) (0.372) (0.033) (0.036) (0.051)
Log Distance sq. 0.057** -0.050 0.061**
(0.007) (0.085) (0.013)
R-bar squared 0.158 0.601 0.236 0.611 0.254 0.601 0.629 0.572 0.065
# of obs. 7260 28 7260 28 7260 28 21 28 6397
Implied weather
  correlation at
300 km 0.305 0.757 0.323 0.899 0.299 0.890 0.820 0.880 0.276
600 km 0.218 0.682 0.186 0.731 0.162 0.890 0.691 0.700 0.153
900 km 0.131 0.607 0.106 0.632 0.108 0.890 0.615 0.595 0.108
OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Europe is the cities Paris, Vienna, Munich, De Bilt, Nottingham, Berlin, Basle, and Stockholm
China is 121 prefectures
**(*) indicates that a coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 1% (5%) level
*** The European data is re-coded to match the distribution of weather in China during 1496-1916 (not 1770-94)